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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly instruct the jury regarding the relevant law? As a 
general rule, Utah appellate courts review jury instructions under a correctness standard, 
granting no particular deference to the trial court. See Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. 
Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993); State v. Gibson. 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 
App.1995), cert, denied. 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996). "It is within the trial court's 
discretion, however, to select between two accurate but different jury instructions." State 
v. Gallegos. 849 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah App. 1993) (citing State v. Pedersen. 802 P.2d 
1328, 1332 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1990)). Also, Utah appellate 
courts "review jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether the instructions, 
taken as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law." Laws v. Blanding City. 
893 P.2d 1083, 1084 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-502 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-524 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(e)(2) 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19 ("Instructions") 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The City of Orem ("the City") concurs in Longoria's statement of the case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Orem police officers arrested Longoria on 3 September 2005 for suspicion of 
impaired driving. R. 00005. During the DUI investigation, Longoria refused to submit to 
field sobriety tests or chemical tests to determine his level of intoxication.2 See 
generally Jury Trial Partial Transcript (discussing Longoria's requests for specific jury 
1
 Longoria did not file a complete transcript of the proceedings below. Thus, this 
statement of facts must remain abbreviated and without recitation of all evidence 
supporting the jury verdict of guilty. Accordingly, the City will recite only those facts 
that can be gleaned from the record on appeal and that pertain directly to the challenged 
jury instructions 
2
 This brief will refer to field sobriety tests and chemical tests either individually, 
or collectively as "sobriety tests." For purposes of analysis, the two are indistinguishable 
and should be subject to identical jury instructions. 
2 
instructions). At a jury trial held on 11 January 2006, the trial court issued two jury 
instructions regarding Longoria's refusal to submit to sobriety tests. Those instructions 
stated as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO FIELD SOBRIETY TEST. You are 
instructed that under the law the refusal of a person to submit to a field 
sobriety tests [sic] is best described as conduct indicating a consciousness 
of guilt. 
R.00046 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO BREATH TEST. You are 
instructed that under the law the refusal of a person to submit 
to a chemical breath test is best described as conduct 
indicating a consciousness of guilt. 
R. 00043. After the jury found Longoria guilty, he moved the trial court for a new trial 
on the basis that the instructions listed above unfairly shifted the burden of proof to 
Longoria. R. 00103. On 10 May 2006, the trial court granted a new trial. R. 00143. 
The trial court held a new jury trial on 18 December 2006. See Jury Trial Partial 
Transcript. Over Longoria's objections, the trial court instructed the jury regarding 
Longoria's refusal to submit to sobriety tests as follows: 
The Defendant is not required, by law, to submit to the 
officer's request to perform field sobriety tests; however, you 
may take notice of and give whatever weight you determine to 
the fact that the defendant refused to perform any field 
sobriety tests. 
R. 00227. 
3 
You may take notice of and give whatever weight you 
determine to the Defendant's refusal to submit to the blood or 
breath test requested by the officer, just as you may weigh and 
consider any evidence presented to you. 
R. 00228. The second jury found Longoria guilty of impaired driving and reckless 
driving. R. 00236-37. This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS3 
Appellant Longoria relies solely on a flawed analogy to cases dealing with a 
suspect fleeing from officers for the proposition that this Court should reverse his 
conviction. Flight from officers presents a particular relevance problem that must be 
cured by limiting instructions. Those relevance problems do not exist in the case of a 
suspect who refuses to submit to sobriety tests because such refusal is directly and 
imminently probative of the suspect's guilt or innocence of the charged crime. Thus, the 
trial court committed no error in refusing to instruct the jury that refusal to submit to 
sobriety tests is susceptible of an innocent explanation. 
Further, no possible reading of the jury instructions could reveal an express or 
implied mandate from the trial court for the jury to presume Longoria's guilt or otherwise 
3
 A large portion of Longoria's brief refers to issues that he has not brought before 
the Court in this case. For example, Longoria's brief refers extensively to his double 
jeopardy claim below without raising the issue on appeal. Further, Longoria's brief 
seems to complain of the trial court's instructions to the jury in the first trial. However, 
any errors in the trial court's instructions in the first trial were cured by granting a new 
trial. Accordingly, this brief will focus solely on the jury instructions in the second trial, 
as those instructions constitute the entirety of issues squarely before this Court. 
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improperly shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Longoria's argument in this regard 
contains inadequate briefing and this Court should disregard it. The argument on its face 
has no merit. 
Even if this Court determines the trial court's instructions were erroneous under 
State v. Bales, it should similarly follow Bales in concluding that such error was 
harmless. See 675 P.2d 573, 574 (Utah 1983). Where sufficient evidence supports the 
verdict, even in the absence of evidence of Longoria's refusal to submit to sobriety tests, 
and where the jury instructions fairly stated the law, a jury verdict should not be 
overturned simply because the jury instructions "are not as full or accurate as they might 
have been." State v. Tuckett 2000 UT App 295,^9 (quotations and citation omitted). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO REVERSIBLE ERROR 
A. Longoria offers no applicable authority 
Longoria argues on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error by failing 
to instruct the jury that failure to submit to sobriety tests could be susceptible of an 
innocent explanation. He cites as his only authority two cases dealing with flight from 
officers, wherein appellate courts have required jury instructions to that effect. See State 
v. Bales. 675 P.2d 573, 574 (Utah 1983); State v. Howland. 761 P.2d 579 (Utah App. 
1988). Not only did these cases deal with the issue of instructing the jury regarding 
possibly innocent explanations for flight, they also dealt with an impermissible shifting of 
5 
the burden of proof to the defendant by instructing the jury that flight constitutes an 
"implied admission" of guilt. See Bales. 675 P.2d 576; Howland. 761 P.2d 580 fii.l. 
In the present appeal, Bales and Howland are unavailing. Those cases thoroughly 
discuss compelling problems arising particularly from flight cases that are just as 
compellingly distinguishable from refusal to perform field sobriety or chemical tests. In 
Bales, witnesses observed the defendants peering into a residence, and later officers 
observed them leaving the front porch. See Bales, 675 P.2d at 574. When ordered by 
officers to stop, both defendants immediately fled. See id. At trial on charges of 
aggravated burglary, the trial court gave the following instruction: 
The flight or attempted flight of a person immediately after 
the commission of a crime or after he is accused of a crime 
that has been committed, is not sufficient in itself to establish 
his guilt, but is a fact which, if proven, may be considered by 
you in the light of all other proven facts in deciding the 
question of his guilt or innocence. The weight to which such 
circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine. 
You are further instructed that flight affords a basis for an 
inference of consciousness of guilt and constitutes an implied 
admission. 
Id. The Utah Supreme Court extensively analyzed the appropriateness of this instruction, 
and concluded that the first paragraph fairly stated the law: "We are . . . persuaded that 
the first paragraph of the flight instruction given in this case was acceptable in view of the 
evidence." Id. at 575. 
The Utah Supreme Court did caution, however, that additional language would be 
appropriate. The Court determined that a "flight instruction will not be completely free 
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from criticism unless it advises the jury that there may be reasons for flight fully 
consistent with innocence and that even if consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it 
does not necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime charged." Id.4 
Although the Supreme Court did not couch the analysis in such terms, its decision 
in Bales essentially turned on a question of relevance. The Supreme Court cited several 
cases for the proposition that flight evidence has limited probative value. The Bales court 
quoted the United States Supreme Court's language in Wong Sun v. United States, which 
stated "'We have consistently doubted the probative value in criminal trials of evidence 
that the accused fled the scene of an actual or supposed crime.'" Bales, 675 P.2d at 574 
(quoting Wong Sun. 371 U.S. 471, 483 fti.10, 83 S.Ct. 407, 415 fh.10 (1963)). The Bales 
court cited several other cases for the proposition that flight evidence has limited 
probative value in determining the guilt of the charged offense. See id. at 575 (citing 
Miller v. United States. 320 F.2d 767, 773 (D.C.Cir.1963) (explaining that flight does not 
necessarily reflect guilt, that jurors may (but need not) consider flight as one circumstance 
tending to show feelings of guilt, and that they may (but need not) consider feelings of 
guilt as evidence tending to show actual guilt); Austin v. United States. 414 F.2d 1155, 
1157 (D.C.Cir. 1969) (explaining that many motives may prompt flight); United States v. 
Borders. 693 F.2d 1318, 1327-28 (11th Cir.1982), cert, denied. 461 U.S. 905, 103 S.Ct. 
4
 State v. Howland is the only other case Longoria cites for the proposition that a 
trial court must instruct the jury regarding the susceptibility of flight to an innocent 
explanation. See 761 P.2d 579 (Utah 1988), Howland adds nothing to the Bales analysis, 
but simply follows Bales without nearly as much analysis and citation. See id. at 580. 
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1875 (1983) (explaining that consciousness of guilt is not necessarily consciousness of 
guilt of the crime charged). See also U.S. v. Akers. 215 F.3d 1089,1103 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(discussing various facts and circumstances that render flight more probative than 
prejudicial). 
Thus, the major potential problem with flight evidence and instructions, under the 
Bales court's analysis, is a question of relevance. Flight from officers may evidence a 
consciousness of guilt, or it may not. Even if such flight does evidence a consciousness 
of guilt, such guilt may not be related to the crime the officers suspect. In addition to the 
reasons provided in the cases cited above, a fleeing suspect may flee because she has 
outstanding warrants, or because she has contraband in her pockets, not because she 
committed the burglary officers suspect. In other words, flight from officers poses a 
special evidentiary problem because it may bear no logically necessary relationship to the 
defendant's guilt or innocence of the suspected crime. Although flight evidence may be 
relevant enough to be admissible, it requires a special instruction regarding the possibility 
of an innocent explanation. See Bales, 675 P.2d at 575. However, Bales did not say that 
jurors may not infer consciousness of guilt from a suspect's flight. See id. (stating "even 
if consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt 
of the crime charged"). 
Other jurisdictions have dealt with the problem of innocent explanations of flight. 
Such explanations have included a fear of mob violence, see People v. Bundv, 129 N.E. 
189 (111. 1920), demands of business or other pressing duties, see Caples v. State, 167 
8 
S.W. 730 (Tex. 1914), and a desire to avoid the indignities of jail, see State v. Sparks, 195 
S.W. 1031 (Mo. 1917). 
Bales and Howland constitute the entire authority upon which Longoria urges this 
Court to reverse his conviction. His analysis expressly analogizes refusal to submit to 
sobriety tests with flight from officers. However, Longoria offers no reasoned analysis 
for the proposition that the two scenarios are analogous. That fact alone should be fatal to 
Longoria's claims on appeal. 
In fact, the flight cases are compellingly distinguishable from the present case. 
Refusal to submit to sobriety tests does not present a relevance problem similar to that 
found in the flight cases. Flight from officers could be easily susceptible of an innocent 
explanation, such as the presence of warrants, failure to properly appreciate an officer's 
identity, or the presence of contraband unrelated to the currently suspected crime. Lawful 
requests to participate in sobriety tests, however, constitute well-established and 
judicially- and legislatively-approved investigatory techniques specifically designed to 
determine whether a suspect is alcohol impaired. 
Sobriety tests, as investigatory methods, are so narrowly tailored to the suspected 
crime of driving while impaired that it is difficult to imagine a single fact scenario that 
would suggest an innocent explanation for a suspect's refusal to perform the tests. In the 
flight cases, innocent hypothetical explanations abound, but neither in his argument 
before the trial court nor in his brief to this Court has Longoria proffered any innocent 
9 
hypothetical explanations for a refusal to perform the requested tests.5 The reason for this 
is that a suspect's refusal to perform the requested tests bears a very special logical 
relevance to the suspected crime of impaired driving. Submission to the tests would 
prove an innocent person innocent and prove a guilty person guilty. A suspect not fleeing 
has no such power to prove guilt or innocence. Thus, refusal to submit to the requested 
tests is not so easily susceptible of an innocent explanation as in the case of flight from 
officers, and is therefore far more probative of the defendant's actual guilt of the charged 
crime. Remaining at the scene of a crime may reveal to officers the presence of unrelated 
contraband; providing a breath sample will only reveal the level of intoxication. 
Although Utah courts have never addressed the issue of the relevance of a 
suspect's refusal to perform sobriety tests, a brief sampling of case law from other 
jurisdictions reveals that courts across the country widely accept the view that a suspect's 
refusal is relevant to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence. See, e.g.. Hill v State, 
366 So 2d 318 (Ala. 1979); Williford v State. 653 P2d 339 (Alaska App. 1982); Allen v 
State. 330 SE2d 588 (Ga. 1985); People v Miller. 394 NE2d 783 (111. 1979); People v 
Kane. 584 NE2d 1044 (111. 1991); People v Haitz. 411 NYS2d 57 (1978); People v 
Ferrara. 602 NYS2d 86 (1993); State v Albright. 298 NW2d 196 (Wis 1980). 
5
 Judge Backlund, during a hearing on the proposed jury instructions, stated "I thought 
the a, argument for the new trial was the consciousness of guilt thing, not that there are other 
reasons consistent with innocence to not take the chemical test. For the life of me I can't figure 
out what they would be." Jury Trial Partial Transcript, p.6. 
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Further, Utah Code section 41-6a-524 expressly authorizes the introduction of 
evidence of a suspect's refusal to submit to chemical tests. 
If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or 
tests or any additional test under Section 41-6a-520, evidence 
of any refusal is admissible in any civil or criminal action or 
proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed 
while the person was operating or in actual physical control of 
a motor vehicle while: (1) under the influence of: 
(a) alcohol. . . . 
Id. Refusal to perform field sobriety tests on the road should receive evidentiary 
treatment no different from refusal to submit to chemical tests. The Utah Legislature has 
expressly authorized introduction of that evidence in criminal impaired driving 
proceedings, and has required nothing further by way of cautionary instructions to the 
jury. 
If courts should analogize refusal to perform field sobriety tests to any other 
scenario, the analogy to a refusal to provide fingerprint or voice samples or other 
performances that provide direct evidence of a suspect's guilt or innocence would be 
better suited than the analogy to flight from officers. In U.S. v. Jackson, for example, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that evidence of a suspect's refusal to furnish 
handwriting samples was probative of his guilt for participating in a scheme involving 
alteration of postal money orders. See 886 F.2d 838, 848 (7th Cir. 1989). The Seventh 
Circuit in that case concluded that the probative value of the defendant's refusal to submit 
handwriting exemplars far outweighed any "conjectural" prejudice, and affirmed the trial 
11 
court's admission of the evidence. Icl The court provided no requirement for jury 
instructions dealing with possibly innocent explanations for the defendant's refusal. 
Because the flight cases are solely concerned with the flight evidence's probative 
value and because no such concern arises out of a suspect's refusal to perform sobriety 
tests, the flight cases Longoria has cited are distinguishable from the present case. Bales 
and Howland are thus inapplicable, and do not provide a legal basis for reversing the 
defendant's convictions here. Longoria has cited no further authority demanding a jury 
instruction regarding a possibly innocent explanation. Without such authority, this Court 
cannot grant Longoria the relief he requests. 
B. The jury instructions did not shift the burden of proof to Longoria 
On pages 11 and 12 of his brief, Longoria argues that the instructions at issue in 
this case unfairly shifted the burden of proof to Longoria, in violation of the presumption 
of innocence. In support of that argument, Longoria cites State v. Robichaux, 639 P.2d 
207 (Utah 1981) and Howland. 761 P.2d at 580 fii.l. 
Robichaux certainly deals with jury instructions that unfairly shift the burden of 
proof to the defendant. In that case, the defendant was charged with theft and tried before 
a jury. See 639 P.2d at 208. The trial court instructed the jury that "the law presumes 
that a person intends the reasonable and ordinary consequences of his own acts." Id The 
Utah Supreme Court concluded this instruction violated the presumption of innocence, 
reasoning: 
12 
The law has long recognized an inference, based on common 
experience, that people generally intend the natural 
consequences of their act. But common experience also 
teaches that that proposition is all too often not true. People 
frequently do not do what they intend and do what they do not 
intend. Given the high standard of proof in a criminal case, 
and the relative burdens on the prosecution and the defense, 
the jury should, at most, be told that it may, on the basis of all 
the evidence, including the inference that people usually 
intend the natural consequences of their acts, find that the 
defendant intended the natural consequences of his act. Had 
that been the case, the jury would have had to consciously 
make a finding as to whether the prosecution had proved the 
requisite intent. But under the instructions given, that intent 
was at least initially established as a matter of law, and the 
burden of persuasion, in the jury's mind, may well have been 
shifted to the defendant. 
Id at 210. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction and 
remanded for a new trial. 
In this case, Longoria argues 
Although the language of the instruction at issue in Bales and 
the language used in the instructions in this case are not 
identical, the language that "under the law" and a failure to 
clarify that reasons for the refusals may be consistent with 
innocence have the same affect [sic] as the "implied 
admission" the Utah Supreme Court found improper in Bales. 
A reasonable juror could certainly interpret the language 
utilized by the court to mean that if they find that the 
Defendant refused to submit to field sobriety tests or refused 
to submit to a chemical test, that his refusals must be 
regarded as a presumption or an admission of guilt. 
Brief of Appellant, p. 12. 
Longoria's admission that "the language of the instruction at issue in Bales and the 
language used in the instructions in this case are not identical" is an understatement. The 
13 
jury instructions at issue in this case bear no resemblance to those in Bales or Robichaux. 
The underlying problem in both of those cases was language that mandated one inference 
or another, creating either a presumption or an implied admission of guilt. The 
instructions at issue here, however, do nothing more than signal to the jury that they may 
consider Longoria's refusal to submit to sobriety tests. Beyond allowing the jury to 
consider the evidence, the instructions explicitly state that the jury may consider the 
evidence in whatever way it deems appropriate. See R. 00227, Jury Instruction 9 ("The 
Defendant is not required, by law, to submit to the officer's request to perform field 
sobriety tests; however, you may take notice of and give whatever weight you determine 
to the fact that the defendant refused to perform any field sobriety tests."); R. 00228, Jury 
Instruction 8 ("You may take notice of and give whatever weight you determine to the 
Defendant's refusal to submit to the blood or breath test requested by the officer, just as 
you may weigh and consider any evidence presented to you."). 
Longoria appears to argue in his brief that since Utah Code section 41-6a-524 
creates a presumption that an impaired driving suspect has given consent to submit to 
sobriety tests, this thereby shifts the burden of proof to that suspect. Section 41-6a-524 
does not, however, address the content of the evidence officers have obtained by the 
suspect's submission to sobriety tests. Without addressing the content of the evidence 
obtained, section 41-6a-524 does not shift the burden of proving anything to the suspect. 
This section, and consequently the jury instructions the trial court issued pursuant to it, 
correctly state that consent has aheady been given to sobriety tests, and that the suspect's 
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refusal to submit may or may not be relevant, depending on how the jury views the 
evidence. 
The express terms of these jury instructions eliminate the problems Longoria 
complains of. He claims the instructions mandate a presumption of guilt where, on their 
face, the instructions allow the jury to consider Longoria's refusal to test in whatever way 
the jury deems appropriate. Under the express terms of the instructions, the jury could in 
fact disregard Longoria's refusal to submit to tests or consider it to be evidence of 
Longoria's innocence. Further, both instructions instruct the jury that Longoria is not 
required to submit to the tests at all. Thus worded, the instructions are in fact more 
favorable to Longoria than to the City. 
Longoria's argument on this point fails to show any way in which the jury could 
understand an unfair presumption of guilt from the language of the instructions. Longoria 
has merely said that it is so, without any meaningful analysis to bolster the assertion. His 
Robichaux argument reiterates the mistaken claim that the trial court must instruct the 
jury regarding possibly innocent explanations for refusing to submit to the tests, and 
concludes from the absence of such an instruction that the burden of proof has been 
unfairly shifted to the defense. Longoria's argument in this regard is inadequately 
briefed, see Utah R. App. P. 24, and should be disregarded by this Court. In any event, an 
instruction like the one Longoria urges should not be necessary absent a contrary 
instruction by the trial court that seems to alter the already existing presumption of 
innocence. 
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The fact that most reasonable people would view Longoria's refusal to test as an 
indication of Longoria's impairment is simply an unfortunate reality that Longoria must, 
in fairness, be required to face. The alternative would be to allow a suspect to refuse to 
perform sobriety tests, and then allow the suspect to disproportionately benefit from that 
refusal by depriving the jury of the natural and reasonable inferences that arise out of the 
refusal. In other words, the result Longoria urges on appeal would create a safe harbor 
for impaired drivers, depriving the government of the most probative and direct avenues 
to investigate impaired driving. 
II. HARMLESS ERROR 
Even if this Court concludes the trial court was in error by not instructing the jury 
as Longoria argues, the conviction should not be reversed because any error was 
harmless. 
A. The instructions fairly stated the law 
Utah appellate courts "will affirm when the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly 
tender the case to the jury [even where] one or more of the instructions, standing alone, 
are not as full or accurate as they might have been." State v. Tuckett 2000 UT App 
295,^9 (quoting State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah Ct.App.1993)) (internal 
quotations omitted) (alteration in original). Utah appellate courts "review jury 
instructions in their entirety to determine whether the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly 
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instruct the jury on the applicable law." Laws v. Blanding City. 893 P.2d 1083, 1084 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). uWe reverse a trial court's decision 
on the basis of an instruction improperly submitted to the jury only where the party 
challenging the propriety of the instruction 'demonstrates prejudice stemming from the 
instructions viewed in the aggregate.'" Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah 
App. 1993) (quoting State v. Haston. 811 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App. 1991), rev'd on other 
grounds. 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993)). 
Although a trial court is obligated "to see that the jury is presented with a party's 
theory of the case," see Kilpatrick v. Wilev. 2001 UT 107,165, 37 P.3d 1130, the trial 
court has broad discretion in fashioning instructions and directing the proceedings to 
ensure that this obligation is met. For example, in State v. Standiford. the defendant 
claimed on appeal from a conviction of murder that he was entitled to a lesser included 
offense instruction regarding manslaughter. See 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988). The 
defendant attacked "the trial court's refusal to give an instruction explaining defendant's 
'theory of the case.'" Id at 266. Although the trial court refused to give an instruction 
specifically tailored to the defendant's theory of the case the "court's instructions on 
manslaughter, self-defense, and voluntary intoxication gave defendant the legal 
framework for his theory of the case, and counsel's arguments to the jury clearly 
elucidated the factual and legal issues from defendant's point of view." Id. (citing State 
v. Torres. 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980)). Ultimately, the Utah Supreme Court 
concluded that, to be entitled to an instruction specifically tailored to the defendant's 
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theory of the case, the trial court must determine in its discretion that sufficient evidence 
supporting that theory was presented at trial. See id. 
Further, as the Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. James, 
The purpose of giving instructions to the jurors is to assist 
them in understanding issues which they have to decide in the 
case. Included in a judge's duty to instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the case is "the right of the defendant to have his 
theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and 
understandable way." However, the trial court is not required 
to give any requested jury instruction if it does not comport 
with the facts or does not accurately state the applicable law. 
819 P.2d 781, 798-99 (Utah 1991) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
In this case, the jury was instructed that the burden of proof always rests with the 
government, and that the burden is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was 
instructed correctly regarding the elements of the crime charged, and was instructed 
correctly that the jury may consider or disregard Longoria's refusal to submit to sobriety 
tests. The jury was further instructed that the law does not require Longoria to submit to 
those sobriety tests. These instructions "gave [Longoria] the legal framework for his 
theory of the case, and counsel's arguments to the jury clearly elucidated the factual and 
legal issues from defendant's point of view." Standiford. 769 P.2d at 266. Further, no 
statute, rule or case law applicable in this jurisdiction mandated the instruction Longoria 
sought from the trial court. The trial court was within its permitted range of discretion to 
refuse the specific instruction Longoria requested, since the requested instruction did "not 
comport with the facts or [did] not accurately state the applicable law." James, 819 P.2d 
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at 799. Nevertheless, Longoria was free to testify regarding his motives for refusing the 
tests, and counsel was free to argue to the jury a theory of innocence in refusing the tests. 
Longoria's ability to testify and argue his innocence explanations for his refusal to 
submit to sobriety tests highlights a major logical problem in his appellate argument. 
Longoria apparently argues on appeal that a trial court's failure to instruct the jury that it 
can consider a defendant's innocence explanations is the logical converse of affirmatively 
instructing the jury that it cannot consider a defendant's innocence explanations. To 
phrase the argument another way, failure to say X is untrue is tantamount to saying X is 
true. A similarly structured argument, though silly, demonstrates the illogic of Longoria's 
argument: "The trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that a witness is not a clown is the 
same as the trial court instructing the jury that the witness is, indeed, a clown." Thus 
reduced to its logical components, Longoria's argument makes no sense, because the trial 
court's silence on the matter says nothing about whether the witness is a clown, 
and the jury could not infer from the instruction that the trial court considers the witness 
to be a clown. 
As noted above, the jury in this case did consider Longoria's innocence 
explanations in the form of testimony and argument. The trial court did nothing to deter 
the jury from considering that evidence, either by express direction or by implied 
disapproval of the innocent explanation evidence. Rather, the trial court remained 
purposefully ambiguous regarding Longoria's refusal to test when it instructed the jury 
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that it could give that refusal whatever weight it deemed appropriate. It also instructed 
the jury regarding the City's burden and Longoria's presumption of innocence. 
B, Longoria has not shown prejudice 
Further, assuming arguendo that the trial court committed error in its jury 
instructions, such error would nevertheless be harmless. Even in Bales, after thoroughly 
analyzing the flight from officers instruction and finding the instruction to have lacked 
important information regarding a potentially innocent explanation for the defendant's 
flight, the Utah Supreme Court nevertheless determined the omission was harmless error. 
See 675 P.2d at 576. The Supreme Court reasoned that had the jury been prevented from 
hearing any evidence of the defendant's flight, the evidence would nevertheless have 
supported a conviction for the charge of theft. 
In this case, Longoria has made no argument that, in the absence of refusal 
evidence, the remaining evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. Indeed, in 
context of the jury instructions that the jury could consider the evidence however it 
would, in the absence of a full transcript of the trial, and without an appellate challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence below, this Court must presume that the jury did not 
believe Longoria's and counsel's innocence explanations. This Court must further 
presume that the overall evidence, minus the refusal evidence, would support the jury 
verdict. See Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2) (entitled "Transcript required of all evidence 
regarding challenged finding or conclusion"); State v. Nine Thousand One Hundred 
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Ninety-Nine Dollars, 791 P.2d 213 (Utah App. 1990) (concluding that, because counsel 
failed to provide the Court of Appeals with all relevant evidence bearing on the issues 
raised on appeal, the court could only presume that the judgment was supported by 
sufficient evidence); Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert, 
denied 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989) (stating where the record before the appellate court is 
incomplete, the court is unable to review the evidence as a whole and must therefore 
presume that the verdict was supported by admissible and competent evidence). 
Because the evidence supported the verdict, even in the absence of the refusal 
evidence, any error in the refusal instructions is harmless. This is so even under Bales, 
the central case Longoria relies on for the proposition that the trial court committed error 
in the first place. 
CONCLUSION 
Longoria has offered no applicable authority that would require reversal of the jury 
verdict. The cases Longoria has cited are distinguishable and without any application to 
the present case. Refusal to submit to sobriety tests bears special relevance to the 
suspected crime of impaired driving, and evidence of such therefore does not require jury 
instructions stating that a suspect's refusal is susceptible to an innocent explanation. 
Further, the jury instructions neither expressly or impliedly shifted the burden of proof to 
the defendant. Rather, the instructions provided a legal framework for defense counsel to 
work out Longoria's theory of the case in argument. Finally, even if the instructions were 
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erroneous, such error is harmless because sufficient evidence supported the verdict even 
in the absence of the disputed evidence and instructions. 
Accordingly, The City respectfully prays this Court to affirm Longoria's 
convictions. 
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